English om Kaviardiplomati
The Swedish MFA is increasing funding to a research institute linked to a dictatorship
Despite known ties to the Azerbaijani dictatorship, the Swedish Foreign Ministry (MFA) has continued to collaborate with the research institute ISDP. In two new decisions this year, the MFA increased funding for ISDP by a total of SEK 1.2 million (aprox. 110,000 €) for its advisory analytical work in the South Caucasus. This may have led the MFA to change its view on sanctions against Azerbaijan.
Av Rasmus Canbäck 13 december, 2023
Also read Blankspot’s previous investigations of ISDP from May 2022 here and here.
Blankspot wrote in the spring of 2021 about the Swedish research institute Institute for Security & Development Policy’s (ISDP) ties to the Azerbaijani dictatorship. While it received up to ten million kronor in annual operating support, it also received funding from a notorious Azerbaijani lobby organization (TEAS) until 2017, and thereafter from a construction company that is a subsidiary of the president’s family’s company Pasha Holding. It was not until Blankspot’s investigations in 2022 that funding from the construction company ceased.
One question we asked at the time was why a Swedish research institute, with funding from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), also received money from an Azerbaijani lobby organization and later a dictatorship-owned construction company? Could ISDP be considered independent from the Azerbaijani state and were there risks that the dictatorship could influence Swedish foreign policy through ISDP?
The investigations sparked criticism of the MFA from MPs from the Liberal Party (L), The Swedish Democrats (SD) and The Left Party (V). Both Björn Söder (SD) and Håkan Svenneling (V) asked questions to Foreign Minister Ann Linde in the Parliamentarian Assembly. However, it should be emphasized that it was under Carl Bildt’s time as foreign minister that ISDP began its collaboration with the MFA.
Since then, the funding of ISDP from Azerbaijan has indeed ceased. However, ISDP’s ties to the country have increased despite the fact that Azerbaijan has developed in an increasingly authoritarian direction in recent years. In a recent report from the American human rights organization Freedom House, Azerbaijan is given bottom marks and is considered one of the most authoritarian countries in the world.
After the latest investigation of ISDP, a lot has happened. For almost ten months, Azerbaijan blocked the humanitarian corridor to Nagorno-Karabakh and in September 2023, Azerbaijan decided to attack the region. This resulted in over 100,000 Armenians, fearing the Azerbaijani army, fleeing to Armenia.
The expulsion led the International Court of Justice in The Hague to make three decisions against Azerbaijan in the past year. Azerbaijan has been ordered to end the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh on two occasions and after the September offensive, Armenians must be given the right to return.
The European Parliament calls the Azerbaijani action an ethnic cleansing and requested in October that the European Commission reconsider its view of Azerbaijan. During the autumn, the European Commission has invited the 27 member states to a dialogue to do just that.
In documents that Blankspot has seen, it is clear that the MFA has decided, despite ISDP’s proven ties to Azerbaijan, to increase the research institute’s grant.
In the spring, it was first increased by SEK 200,000 (aprox. 19,000 €) for a ”temporary strengthening of analytical capacity focused on Europe’s neighborhood”. On November 10, a decision was made to add an additional SEK 1,000,000 (aprox. 92,000 €) in resources to ISDP. The motivation states:
”Since then [spring], the development of events in the Caucasus, which is one of ISDP’s major areas of activity, has intensified and after discussions with ISDP, it is proposed that an additional SEK 1,000,000 be added to existing operating support.”
We have been denied access to the documents that concern the dialogue with ISDP that led to the decision to increase the grant.
“Independence in relation to financiers”
In a comment to Blankspot, the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s press office states that official relations with dictatorships in some parts of the world can be a prerequisite for operating.
”The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cooperates with a number of think tanks and institutes. These partnerships are important for in-depth knowledge of different countries and regions as well as their perspectives on security policy developments.
The think tanks and institutes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports also need to be able to operate in and about states that are not democracies. In some parts of the world, relations with official representatives may be necessary in order to carry out meaningful work.
ISDP is a Stockholm-based research and think tank. The Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, is one of the organization’s geographical areas of focus where the emphasis is on the analysis of political development, regional security and conflicts as well as relations with the EU, the USA and Russia.
On ISDP’s website, it is stated who, in addition to Sweden, finances the institute’s operations and projects. The analytical independence in relation to the financiers is emphasized. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan is no longer on the list of financiers.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continuously reviews the funding to different partner organizations. In preparation for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ decision to support, an assessment is made of how well the organization’s operations are in line with foreign policy priorities, the organization’s ability to achieve its objectives as well as potential risks. Ethical issues are also included in the assessment. In connection with the termination or renewal of partnerships, the achievement of goals and the risk analysis are followed up.”
In a review of ISDP’s financiers over the years, Central Asia and the Caucasus, in addition to those already mentioned, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and a subsidiary of Russian Gazprom are found.
We draw the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to these connections. They gave a repeated answer according to the above.
Organizational ties to Azerbaijan
Even though ISDP no longer receives money from Azerbaijan, the organizational ties remain strong and have even increased.
The connection is primarily through ISDP’s subsidiary institute Central Asia-Caucasus Initiative & Silk Road Studies Program (CACI & SRSP). They are also linked to the conservative American think tank American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC).
ISDP’s rector Svante Cornell is the director of CACI & SRSP, while AFPC’s representative Frederick Starr is the chairman of the joint institute.
Frederick Starr, like Svante Cornell, has several ties to Azerbaijan. For example, both sit on the editorial board of the Azerbaijani academic journal Caucasus International Journal, which is run by the state-owned think tank Air Center. The chairman of Air Center, Farhad Shafijev, is also chairman of Caucasus International Journal. Air Center’s goal, as described on its website, is to ”highlight Azerbaijan’s foreign policy to the international community.”
Among Air Center’s partners are Russian and Belarusian state think tanks.
In a previous investigation, Svante Cornell said that the work on the editorial board is unpaid. He also referred to a text from 2019 that he wrote (in Swedish) for the think tank Frivärld (Free World) about how to conduct foreign policy towards dictatorships. In it, he discusses how a democracy should handle dilemmas in conducting foreign policy in non-democracies. In short, one of the theses is that democratic countries do not need to distance themselves from authoritarian regimes if they have liberal elements. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are examples of such, according to Cornell.
In addition to Svante Cornell and Frederick Starr, the American energy expert Brenda Shaffer is also a recurring figure at CACI & SRSP. She has been singled out by the journalist network OCCRP for having close financial and organizational ties to Azerbaijan. Among other things, she has worked as an advisor to the state-owned oil company Socar.
CACI & SRSP has published several of her articles, and she is a frequent guest on their media channels. Her latest publication with CACI & SRSP, from October this year, entitled ”A New Spring for Caspian Transit and Trade”, is co-authored by Svante Cornell. In the 17-page report, they advocate for increased trade and investment in infrastructure projects in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.
Brenda Shaffer is also a member of the advisory board of Caucasus International Journal.
However, the clearest organizational connection to Azerbaijan at ISDP is held by Frederick Starr, chairman of CACI & SRSP.
For a few years now, he has served on the board of trustees of the state-owned Azerbaijani ADA University, which was founded to have a specialized education for diplomats. Its rector Hafiz Pashayev is the uncle of vice president Mehriban Aliyeva. Aliyeva is the wife of president Ilham Aliyev. Mehriban Aliyeva, like Frederick Starr, sits on the board of ADA along with other members, including Azerbaijan’s foreign minister Jeyhun Bayramov.
According to an investigation by the now political prisoner Gubad Ibadoglu, ADA University receives the equivalent of 35.3% of the Azerbaijani state budget for universities. This makes the university the largest in the country, at least in terms of finances.
Another name that stands out on the board is René van der Linden, who was previously president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from 2005 to 2008. These were the years when Azerbaijan began its activities in the Council of Europe and which a few years later led to some of the biggest corruption scandals in European politics ever. It is therefore the same lobbying organization (TEAS) that ISDP received money from that was one of the driving forces behind the scandal.
In 2017, Sweden’s current Foreign Minister Tobias Billström, in collaboration with the Moderate Party-controlled Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation, organized a seminar in the Council of Europe on Azerbaijani caviar diplomacy based on the above-mentioned scandal.
In any case, Van der Linden has been investigated by the Dutch intelligence service for his ties to Russia. He denies the allegations.
ADA University, together with Air Center, also organized the conference in Azerbaijan that was the origin of Blankspot’s previous investigations of ISDP. In recent days, from December 4 to 7, 2023, another conference was organized by ADA and Air Center where Brenda Shaffer was once again a guest.
The conferences were held in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Those who travel from the Azerbaijani side can only do so under surveillance and at the invitation of the Azerbaijani state.
For 2022, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry reported that over 200 journalists had traveled on organized press trips to Nagorno-Karabakh, which were either fully or partially funded by the state. Likewise, the international researchers who travel to conferences there are carefully selected. In other words, a critical researcher, like a journalist, is not asked to participate by Azerbaijan.
Svante Cornell, Brenda Shaffer and Frederick Starr have all participated in one or more of the conferences.
We contacted ISDP with questions about how they view the newly added grant, how recent events have affected their analysis and what advice they gave during the autumn. We have also asked questions about how they view potential conflicts of interest with Frederick Starr serving on the ADA University Board of Trustees. They have been given eight days to answer the questions.
Through their press officer Anna Jermuth, they answer:
”ISDP as an organization advocates no line on any issue, but allows individual analysts and researchers to freely reach their own conclusions. An important part of ISDP’s mandate is to work in and contribute to increased understanding of non-democratic states. In this Azerbaijan is no different from other countries we work with. As can be seen from ISDP’s published activities in 2023, it can be added that Azerbaijan is not currently a country that is the main focus of ISDP’s analytical activities.”
Furthermore, they refer to the text for Frivärld which is mentioned above in the article.
But the question is why the Swedish Foreign Ministry is increasing funding for ISDP today?
Blankspot has contacted Frederick Starr and Brenda Shaffer for comments.
The West is reassessing its view of Azerbaijan
With the decision in November, the Swedish Foreign Ministry is increasing funding for ISDP’s work in the Caucasus by an additional one million kronor (totaling 1.2 million, aprox 110,000 €). This comes at a time when the EU is in the process of reorienting its view of Azerbaijan. The basic grant from the Swedish Foreign Ministry for ISDP for 2023 is 5 million kronor (aprox. 470,000 €). This represents a proportional increase of almost 25%.
After Azerbaijan’s so-called ”anti-terrorist operation” against Nagorno-Karabakh in September, the reactions from the international community have been clear. The European Parliament adopted, with a large majority, a hastily drafted resolution condemning Azerbaijan for what they call a ”ethnic cleansing”. The US State Department followed with sharp condemnations, as did the European Commission and the Council of Europe.
France has begun exporting military equipment to Armenia during the fall, and the US decided to suspend its military cooperation with Azerbaijan. The EU has decided to strengthen its civilian observation force in Armenia, which monitors the border with Azerbaijan.
The actions of the West have led Azerbaijan to enter into verbal and diplomatic conflict with both France and the US. Azerbaijan has imprisoned several journalists whose independent newspaper received funding from the American USAID, and the American aid agency is in the process of being expelled from the country.
EU Commission has as a result of Azerbaijan’s actions invited the 27 member states for a dialogue on how the position towards the Caucasus can be re-evaluated. While an expanded cooperation with Armenia has been recommended widely by almost all member states, handling of Azerbaijan has proved to be more complicated.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, EU has signed an agreement to double its gas import from Azerbaijan. Despite the fact that it is non-transparent how much of the Azerbaijani gas is actually Russian, the decision has remained in place. EU’s energy cooperation stands in contrast to how Azerbaijan has almost tripled the number of political prisoners since 2021 (from 99 to around 260), as well as canceled several meetings within the framework of EU’s and USA’s efforts of mediation regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.
Like EU Parliament, which considers that it is time to investigate sanctions against Azerbaijan, important voices from several member states have said that the issue should be reviewed. In other words, the question of the possibility of sanctions against Azerbaijan has been forced to be lifted to EU’s agenda for discussion, even though EU Commission has long been opposed to it.
The questions during the fall have been about when and what sanctions would entail?
The Swedish Foreign Ministry hesitates on sanctions, despite broad political will
When the Swedish government was preparing for EU summits in October, however, there was no mention of Sweden’s view that sanctions against Azerbaijan are currently relevant.
The issue was discussed at two EU committee meetings in the Riksdag on October 20 and November 10.
From the protocol from the EU committee meeting on October 20, in preparation for the EU Council meeting on October 23-25, the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s position was presented by Tobias Billström’s State Secretary Jan Knutsson. He did mention “that no measures can be ruled out”, but did not specify that this was about sanctions.
This was met with criticism from almost all Riksdag parties, who through their representatives wanted sanctions to be raised to the agenda to a greater or lesser extent. After a compromise process, the EU committee’s position finally landed on the compromise that sanctions are an action that cannot be ruled out.
According to the background papers that Blankspot requested for the October Council meeting, Sweden’s position is summarized briefly as follows:
”Sweden can request, or alternatively support others’ proposals for, additional wording on EU’s support for Armenia, and clearer about Azerbaijan’s responsibility.”
The background papers on which the position is based are, apart from the Riksdag protocol, almost entirely classified in matters concerning Azerbaijan. It is therefore impossible to determine how the Swedish Foreign Ministry arrived at its conclusion.
At the meeting in October, the question of Nagorno-Karabakh was not taken up due to the fact that other geopolitical conflicts (Ukraine and Gaza) took up all the time. Nagorno-Karabakh was thus deferred to the next Council meeting on November 13-14.
In the protocol from the debate in the EU committee on November 10, Foreign Minister Tobias Billström expresses that Sweden’s opinion is the same as before the 23rd of October. He further develops that Sweden supports the EU Commission’s communication to Azerbaijan that the union is ready to take action, which could include sanctions.
As the main debate had already been held at the previous meeting on November 20, this time it was shorter. Despite this, criticism of the Swedish line was again raised by the Center Party and the Social Democrats, who wanted Sweden to actively work for sanctions, which was recorded in the protocol. The Left Party and the Sweden Democrats, who had previously driven the issue of Sweden working for sanctions, announced that they were satisfied with the current wording.
In other words, a sharp proposal for sanctions was dropped when the majority will stood behind the earlier compromise that has become Sweden’s line on the issue.
In his closing remarks on November 10, Billström gave examples of how sanctions could become relevant if the human rights situation in Nagorno-Karabakh worsens or if the Armenians’ right to return is ”curtailed”.
”One thing is that it is naturally difficult to say with certainty what development could lead to sanctions. In such situations, there must be a discussion within the EU. But some examples of serious events are naturally violations of Armenia’s territorial integrity, violations of human rights in Nagorno-Karabakh, and a denied right for Armenians to return to Nagorno-Karabakh.”
When we ask the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s press office about Sweden’s view on sanctions, they confirm that it is in line with the European Commission’s.
”In accordance with EU High Representative Josep Borrell’s statement from the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on November 13, the EU should clearly signal to Azerbaijan that the Union is ready to take appropriate action if Armenia’s territorial integrity is violated. If the situation worsens, no action should be ruled out, including sanctions.”
However, there is also a discrepancy between how Sweden’s MEPs view sanctions and how the Swedish government has dealt with the issue. When the European Parliament voted to urge the European Commission to impose sanctions, all Swedish parliamentarians, including from the governing parties, supported the resolution (except for Peter Lundgren, who has no political affiliation*).
The liberal MEP Karin Karlsbro went a step further when she, together with the Liberal Party’s foreign policy spokesperson Joar Forssell, wrote an opinion piece in October. In it, they demanded that the EU impose ”far-reaching economic sanctions” against Azerbaijan (which Joar Forssell also partly raised at the EU committee meeting on October 20).
The will of the Parliamentarian Parties, at least in public, to impose sanctions against Azerbaijan therefore appears to be sharper than the implementation after the negotiations. It is possible to argue that the government’s position slowed down the parliamentary will to drive the issue of sanctions against Azerbaijan. While some parties, such as the Liberals, the Sweden Democrats, and the Left Party, initially made clear demands for sanctions, they backed down their position after negotiations had taken place in parliament based on the Foreign Ministry’s position.
How much ISDP has been involved in orienting the Foreign Ministry on the issue is difficult to say, as the documents from the Foreign Ministry are classified. What can be concluded is that the research institute has been involved enough since the spring for the Foreign Ministry to want to allocate funding to ISDP for its advice on the South Caucasus in two rounds.
*Before it said that Peter Lundgren is a member of the Swedish Democrats, but, since March 2022, he is unaffliated with any party.
Top Picture: A collage with Azerbaijani soldiers in front of the logotype of ISDP.
