English om Armenien, Azerbajdzjan, Nagorno-Karabach
Analysis: Predicting an Azerbaijani Attack
In recent years, attacks from Azerbaijan against Armenia have increased. Before each military escalation, similar patterns have been identified. In this analysis, Rasmus Canbäck outlines the signs aiming to predict future attacks.
Av Rasmus Canbäck 16 april, 2024
Since Azerbaijan attacked Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016, the conflict with both Nagorno-Karabakh and neighbouring Armenia has escalated. The 2016 war is referred to as the ”four-day war,” but it turned out to be just the beginning of a series of military escalations that have continued since then.
In this analysis, I go through the signs preceding a military escalation of the conflict. Initially, it is important to establish that the military escalations have almost exclusively been from Azerbaijan towards Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. The premise is based on several assumptions.
Partly because the Armenian side, in general, and the de facto government of Nagorno-Karabakh in particular, have had nothing to gain from an escalation. Also, Azerbaijan’s military capability exceeds that of Armenia both militarily and materially. Moreover, only Azerbaijan has achieved military successes since 2016, as repeatedly emphasized by the country’s President Ilham Aliyev. Armenia’s arguments to abandon the peace negotiations of the 1990s in favour of conflict have been few, if any.
With the establishment that Azerbaijan is responsible for the military escalation, I leave the matter at that. The purpose of the analysis is, as stated, to identify signs that Azerbaijan will once again attack Armenia. Up until September 2023, it would also be applicable to Nagorno-Karabakh, but after the ”military operation” against Nagorno-Karabakh that month, only a handful of Armenians remain of the previously nearly 150,000 Armenians (counted from before the war in 2020).
The analysis is written with some humility, acknowledging that there is significantly more data to gather to strengthen the conclusion, which I leave to researchers and security analysts to spend more time on. However, its purpose is to provide knowledge for diplomats, journalists, and analysts to anticipate Azerbaijani attacks.
It should be noted that the reactions and policies of the international community influence the likelihood of whether attacks will occur or not. For example, the EU’s current policy is to investigate economic sanctions against Azerbaijan if the country attacks Armenia. Such a policy likely contributes to reducing the risk of military escalation. Another example is the EU’s observation mission in Armenia, with personnel on-site since the fall of 2022, which probably has contributed to significant attacks on Armenia’s territory decreasing.
At the end of the article, a summarized conclusion is presented.
The attacks I have studied are: a) The four-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh 2016 (Azerbaijan took control of strategic heights in the northeastern parts of Nagorno-Karabakh’s controlled areas). b) The forty-four-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh 2020 (Azerbaijan took control of two-thirds of the areas that Nagorno-Karabakh controlled until then). c) The September attack on Armenia 2022 (Azerbaijan has occupied approximately 29,000 square meters of Armenian territory since then, according to Armenian sources). d) The September attack on Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 (Azerbaijan took control of the remaining parts of Nagorno-Karabakh).
The data I have studied includes: a) Azerbaijan’s purchase of military equipment from Israel. b) Statements from the Armenian defense forces since May 2021. c) Creation of legal narratives ahead of the attacks. d) Behaviors in social media accounts likely part of Azerbaijan’s psychological warfare.
It’s worth noting that the work I have done is partly compiling others’ work in this article. When this happens, I have referenced them in this article.
Azerbaijan’s Purchase of Military Equipment from Israel
One of the most reliable indicators that Azerbaijan is preparing an attack is data on the number of transport planes that have flown from the Negev Desert in Israel to Azerbaijan.
As close allies, Israel’s oil purchases from Azerbaijan have increased in recent years, and for 2023, Azerbaijani crude oil is estimated to cover almost half of Israel’s needs. Similarly, Azerbaijan’s purchases of high-tech military equipment from Israel have increased. In 2021, SIPRI published a report showing that 69% of Azerbaijan’s military equipment purchases came from Israel.
According to a 2024 report from the Baku Research Institute, Israel buys Azerbaijani oil at a somewhat subsidized price.
Israeli journalist Avi Scharf has been tracking all transport planes presumably exporting military equipment from Israel to Azerbaijan since 2016. The statistics are divided into transports that took place in the first and second halves of the year, but the more detailed statistics show an increase in transports leading up to major attacks.
The clearest example is before Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2020 when the number of planes increased significantly (see statistics). The same pattern was observed before the attack on Armenia in 2022 and the final attack on Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023.
The import of military equipment from Israel has become one of the clearest indicators that Azerbaijan is preparing an attack.
Statements from the Armenian Ministry of Defence
First and foremost, the reason I have not included the Azerbaijani Defense Force’s statements in the statistics is that they do not significantly contribute to the data. They resemble the statements from the Armenian Defense Force, but are essentially reversed. When the Armenian Defense Force reports ”shootouts,” the Azerbaijani Defense Force does the same but in the opposite direction, possibly using the term ”provocations.”
However, there might be other reasons to closely examine Azerbaijani reporting, such as changes in language over time.
The data was originally compiled by Twitter user @Armamma2002, whose real name is Artur. His method is to categorize all statements as they come in, making it easy to fact-check the statistics. Based on this, he has created a chart tracking the number of statements. I have sorted the statements and broken down the statistics into further detail (from May 2021 to April 6, 2024).
The data should be viewed in relation to the other three perspectives to be fully understood. The statistics only concern Armenia, not Nagorno-Karabakh, although there is some correlation between the Armenian Defense Force’s statements and attacks on Nagorno-Karabakh as well. In some cases, attacks on Nagorno-Karabakh have occurred during periods of calm at the Armenian border.
Statements can be sorted into six different categories (see the charts), with the three primary ones being ”shooting” (49.5%), ”refutation” (32%), and ”calm situation” (12%).
The latter category has often followed attacks. The most common category, ”shootings,” naturally increases significantly when attacks occur. However, the interest lies in the weeks leading up to the attacks.
An example is before the attacks on Armenia from September 12 to 14, 2022, where shootouts began to increase from May until the attack in September. During the same period, specifically mid-July 2022, the EU signed new gas agreements with Azerbaijan.
In the weeks following, the number of statements about shootouts increased until August 1. Azerbaijan then attacked the town of Lachin, which was still controlled by Nagorno-Karabakh at the time, forcing a surrender (which, according to the ceasefire agreement from November 9, 2020, should have occurred by November 2023 at the latest).
This was met with statements from the Armenian Defense Force primarily denying the accusations since the Azerbaijani side accused Armenia of cross-border shootouts at the time. The only report of ”infiltration” also occurred then.
Shortly after, the number of reports of shootings against Armenia increased again.
However, there are examples when an increased density of shootings did not result in a military attack on Armenia. The clearest example is at the end of March and beginning of April 2023. Both images of military movements and psychological warfare indicated a significant risk of escalation. To some extent, this was halted by Iran conducting significant military exercises along the Azerbaijani-Iranian border, which may have helped stabilize the situation.
The tense period was followed by the intensification of the blockade of the Lachin corridor to Nagorno-Karabakh. The so-called eco-activists stated that their mission was completed when the Azerbaijani military built a border station at the foot of the Lachin corridor. Moreover, Azerbaijan attacked and closed the alternative mountain path (called the “black road” by many locals) that some Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh had been able to use to bypass the blockade.
In summary: Increased reports of shootouts in recent years have led to the risk of either direct attacks or other military strategic measures following suit.
Creation of Legal Narratives Before Attacks
It is widely known that Azerbaijan has changed its rhetoric regarding Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia in recent years. For example, it wasn’t until President Ilham Aliyev mentioned ”Western Azerbaijan” in a speech in December 2022 that the concept gained traction in Azerbaijan. This was followed by the establishment of the ”Organization for Western Azerbaijan,” which has now garnered considerably more attention than just two years ago.
Azerbaijani political scientist Bahruz Samadov has written several analyses about the changing rhetoric of the leader from before the 2020 war and after. Several Armenian analysts, such as Azerbaijan expert Tatev Hayrapetyan and analyst & diplomacy expert Sossi Tatikyan, have written texts about Ilham Aliyev’s narratives. However, few have specifically written about the creation of legal narratives before attacks.
Swedish top diplomat Hans Blix describes in his book ”A Farewell to Wars,” which summarizes his diplomatic work, that international law is largely still being followed. He argues that even the most authoritarian regimes adhere to it when violating international law.
This also applies to Azerbaijan, which at an early stage before each attack prepares a narrative.
The latest example is how Azerbaijani and Turkish media currently claim that Armenia is the provocateur of the increased shootings at the border. The purpose is probably to repeat it often enough so that enough foreign diplomats will listen to the argument if an attack occurs.
Months before the military offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, one of the most commonly used arguments was that the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh should have the same rights as everyone else in Azerbaijan. This was reiterated before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, and senior Western diplomats and analysts believed that Azerbaijan should be given a chance to prove itself.
Before the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, the classic arguments about the right to territorial integrity were strengthened. The packaging included several legal arguments, including selectively reiterating UN Security Council resolutions from the early 1990s. In most articles from journalists covering conflicts from the Azerbaijani side, these narratives were indeed reiterated.
The purpose of packaging the legalization of attacks is to create arguments that the international community needs to consider when accountability is demanded. Based on the attacks I have studied for this article, it seems to have been effective.
Behaviors in Azerbaijani Social Media Accounts
The Azerbaijani state primarily has four communication channels to convey messages related to escalations of the conflict. The first is official rhetoric (see above), the second is statements from the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry. The third is state-controlled media, and the fourth is social media accounts considered part of the country’s psychological warfare (so-called ”psy-ops”).
These serve different purposes. While official rhetoric sets the agenda, the other three can serve as channels to send out messages that are uncomfortable or of a more informal nature. Anonymous social media accounts can more freely convey messages for psychological warfare.
First and foremost, it is important to establish evidence of how these are linked to the state. The clearest example is before the attacks on Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 when images and videos of troop movements and scare propaganda were pumped out in early September, about two to three weeks before the attack. Suddenly, calls were made that it was forbidden to show videos of troop movements. From that moment, with clear discipline, all such images ceased within minutes. This applied to all about ten such channels primarily on the Telegram platform.
Similarly, anonymous accounts on Twitter ceased to further distribute the images.
Just as Psy-ops are used by Russia in the war in Ukraine, they have had a similar function in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. During ongoing attacks, for example, images of war crimes have been published. In a report from September 2023, I found that the rigorous control over these accounts allows the regime to filter which war crimes should be communicated, and which should not be shown. The latter we are unlikely to ever find out if they have occurred.
However. Before the attacks, behaviors in the channels have gone through three stages. The first has been nationalist messages, the second has been images of troop movements, and the third has been praises of the Azerbaijani army. The praises have been published just days before the attacks.
This is exemplified by the attack on Armenia in September 2022, the escalation in March 2023, and finally before the attack on Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.
Conclusions
The purpose of the article is to provide different perspectives on behaviors from Azerbaijan as a military escalation approaches. The analysis is limited by its length, and there is a need for more case studies. Even if the four different parameters more or less occur, it does not necessarily mean that a military escalation is happening, although it is an indicator.
However, the perspectives should be seen as a tool to predict the behavior of the Azerbaijani military. One of the most common questions that I, as a specialized journalist on the conflict, get is: when will the next war come?
So far, it has been answered based on a well-founded gut feeling and only with guesses. The combination of the four perspectives can at least contribute to a guess built on empiricism.
This also applies to the tense situation currently taking place. At least three out of four perspectives are fulfilled. During the first three months of the year, six military transports have flown from Israel to Azerbaijan. Moreover, the number of cross-border shootings during the first week of April has increased significantly, and Azerbaijan has created a legal narrative by repeating that it is Armenia that is ”provoking.”
As for now, the regime-friendly channels on social media are not dominated by either hostile messages or images of troop movements. But, In the beginning of April the channels posted many videos with allegations of Armenian troop movements, where some were, according to the Armenian side, pictures of maintenance work from a few months back.
The above should also be seen in light of the reactions, politics, and negotiations of the international community. Here, the EU and the USA have more clearly at least taken a political stance in favor of Armenia, even if trade with Azerbaijan is constantly increasing.
It can be stated that the reactions of the international community have a stabilizing impact, although so far it has not been a guarantee.
Top picture: Pictures of troop movement were forbidden in Azerbaijan in September 2023. From one minute to another, the regime friendly channels stopped publishing them.
Do you want to share your experiences or knowledge? Send an e-mail to rasmus@blankspot.se
