With one month remaining until Armenia’s parliamentary election, Russian election interference has become a heated topic of debate in the country. Through a confidential document, Blankspot can reveal how Russia planned to reduce the popularity of the Armenian government.
Av Rasmus Canbäck 9 maj, 2026
Blankspot has obtained, through a trusted source, a Russian document titled “Programme for Work in the ‘Anti-Pashinyan’ Direction for 2026.”
The document outlines both overarching objectives and concrete methods for how the work is to be carried out.
Among other things, the document states that a central goal is to frame the election as a vote of confidence against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan personally. It also describes efforts to limit the influence of the sitting Armenian government ahead of the parliamentary elections on 7 June. Another objective is to prevent Pashinyan’s “political image” from changing or being “modernized” before the vote.
However, the document does not specify which opposition party Russia prefers over Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party. Instead, it describes the tools that are to be used to influence public opinion.
Among the proposals is a plan to triple the presence of Russia-aligned narratives on social media compared to autumn 2025 — from one million views per day to as many as three million. According to the document, the number of opinion makers in the Russia-aligned network is to be expanded from 15 to around 40 individuals.
The document further states that the most prominent among them are to be placed in electable positions within opposition parties ahead of the election.
It also describes so-called “false flag” campaigns on social media, targeted comment campaigns against campaign workers from the ruling party, and the establishment of dedicated “stringer groups” to produce exclusive content during the election campaign.
At the beginning of the document, Russia’s objectives ahead of the Armenian election are outlined. The full document can be read in both Russian and English.
Blankspot has been able to verify the authenticity and origin of the document, but it is not possible to determine to what extent the strategy has actually been implemented or how central it is to Russian influence efforts ahead of the election. Several aspects of the document do, however, correspond with recent developments in Armenia.
In the course of verifying the document, Blankspot established that it originated from materials obtained after a person operating within the Russian intelligence services was hacked by a third party before March 2026. His activities in Armenia mirror the contents of the document.
In Armenia, the man has participated in conferences and seminars, met opposition politicians, and frequently commented in the media on the country’s political development. The message has often been the same: that Armenia is heading down a dangerous path by turning away from Russia.
The debate in Armenia over Russian influence ahead of the parliamentary elections led the Armenian government, already in December 2025, to request EU assistance to counter Russian influence — the same type of support that had been provided to Moldova during its parliamentary elections the previous year.
According to EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, the same networks that were previously active in Moldova are now also operating in Armenia.
Similar suspicions have also been directed at neighbouring Georgia, where special EU support measures were not invited during the 2024 election.
In April, Meta shut down around 70 Facebook accounts and pages in Armenia that were deemed fake. At the same time, Russian officials have repeatedly accused Armenian civil society organisations of spreading “anti-Russian narratives”. Cybersecurity analysts have also pointed to Russia carrying out so-called phishing attacks against Armenia.
Patrik Oksanen, Senior Fellow at the think tank Stockholm Free World Forum and an expert on Russian influence operations, said the contents of the document align closely with a report from the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency.
“What becomes clear from the document is that Russian influence is not primarily about propaganda in the classical sense. It is about social engineering — creating mistrust, polarisation, and resignation within society.”
He continued by arguing that the strategy is not new.
“They are not only trying to influence what people think, but how people react, feel, and act politically — during the Soviet era this came to be known as reflexive control. And it is carried out in a highly systematic, data-driven, and organised way, almost like modern advertising campaigns or psychological operations. The case of Armenia is yet another confirmation of this.”
Oksanen also warned that traditional methods used to counter Russian influence — by strengthening Western resilience through knowledge, fact-checking, and increased cybersecurity — have not been fully effective.
“That is in itself good, but not sufficient. We have since tried to reduce reach and capabilities through sanctions against individuals and entities, as well as by placing demands on social media companies to reduce amplification and dissemination. That has not deterred or changed Moscow’s willingness to attack us either. We have now reached the point where the West needs to consider additional methods.”
One month before the election, it is clear that the race stands between the incumbent government led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the newly formed Strong Armenia party of Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan. Opinion polls show a clear lead for the government.
The parliamentary election in June will be the first since the snap election in summer 2021, which was held only months after the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in autumn 2020.
Although Civil Contract won the 2021 election, Pashinyan’s popularity has since weakened. One important reason is that more than 100,000 Armenians were forced to flee Nagorno-Karabakh in autumn 2023 following Azerbaijan’s offensive. At the same time, critics have argued that parts of the democratic reform agenda promised after the 2018 change of power, when Pashinyan came to office, have failed to materialise.
Most internationally recognised indices tracking democratic development worldwide indicate stagnation since 2018. In the latest World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders, Armenia fell 16 places to rank 50 out of 180 — a level comparable to Romania, but still standing out in a region with several authoritarian neighbours.
On 7 May, Pashinyan announced that he would not participate in Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May commemorating the Second World War.
Top image: Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the Victory Day parade in Moscow in 2025. Photo: priminister.am
